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Abstract
The most common test for overconﬁdence in the form of miscalibrationthe In-
terval Production task (IP)is based on the assumption that people internalize re-
quested conﬁdence levels. We demonstrate experimentally that decision makers' per-
ceived conﬁdence is, however, unaﬀected by variations in the requested conﬁdence
level. In addition, we ﬁnd large heterogeneity in perceived conﬁdence that the tradi-
tional IP measure fails to account for. We show that the alternative measure based
on decision makers' perceived conﬁdence by contrast yields coherent, moderate over-
conﬁdence levels. Our evidence suggests that the consistency of the two measures is
limited and that they are related to diﬀerent individual characteristics.
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1 Introduction
Numerous studies have demonstrated that overconﬁdence can lead to suboptimal de-
cisions in a variety of domains (Camerer and Lovallo, 1999; Johnson and Tierney, 2011;
Malmendier and Tate, 2005; Odean, 1998). The most robust documentation of overcon-
ﬁdence is that people overestimate the precision of their own judgment (for a review, see
Lichtenstein et al., 1982; Moore et al., 2014). This form of overconﬁdence, called miscali-
bration, overprecision, or judgmental overconﬁdence, induces people to rely too much on
their own (biased) judgment and thus is an integral part of biased decision making in gen-
eral (Bazerman and Moore, 2013).1 The mainly used test for it is the Interval Production
task (IP).2 In the IP, decision makers are asked to provide lower and upper bound estimates
(intervals) for a set of questions like How long is the Nile river?. Subjects are instructed to
state intervals such that their own conﬁdence, that the true, unknown value falls between
these stated bounds, equals a conﬁdence level that is requested by the experimenter, for
example 90%. On average, the ratio of true values that fall into decision makers' interval
estimates, the hit rate, should correspond to the requested conﬁdence level (in this case
90%). However, commonly people are found to have much lower hit rates, so that they are
classiﬁed as overconﬁdent (Alpert and Raiﬀa, 1982; Russo and Schoemaker, 1992).
This paper aims to critically assess the suitability of the IP to measure overconﬁdence.
Recent studies have already suggested that the IP measure may not function as presumed.
In particular, it has been shown that groups with diﬀerent requested conﬁdence levels
achieve the same average hit rate because they do not adjust the width of their interval
estimates (Teigen and Jørgensen, 2005).3 In addition, when estimating their own number
of hits (frequency judgments) people tend to be only conservatively conﬁdent in their
own intervals compared to the typically high level of requested conﬁdence (Cesarini et al.,
2006; Winman et al., 2004). What remains unsolved, however, is the actual eﬀect of the
requested conﬁdence level on the perceived level of conﬁdence. Will people, for example,
still provide conservative frequency judgments if the requested conﬁdence level is low?
An experimental economist who studies the relation of overconﬁdence and economic
behavior nonetheless can be agnostic about these points of critique as they address the
1In the following, we will use only the term overconﬁdence to refer to judgmental miscalibration, unless
stated otherwise.
2See, e.g. Alpert and Raiﬀa (1982); Ben-David et al. (2013); Biais et al. (2005); Russo and Schoemaker
(1992).
3These ﬁndings are based on between-subject variation of the requested conﬁdence level. In response
to within-subject variation of the requested conﬁdence level decision makers have been shown to adjust
their interval estimates (see, e.g. Alpert and Raiﬀa, 1982; Budescu and Du, 2007).
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aggregate, not the individual level. Therefore, it is not surprising that the IP has been
used in numerous experimental studies to elicit overconﬁdence at the individual level and
link it to economic behavior (for most recent studies, see Ackert et al., 2015; Ben-David
et al., 2013; Fellner-Röhling and Krügel, 2014; Herz et al., 2014), but the results are still
surprisingly inconclusive overall.
Against this background, we address three open issues to help understanding the mea-
surement of aggregate and individual overconﬁdence in the IP paradigm. First, one might
wonder why decision makers are unable to adapt their intervals widths in the IP. To pro-
vide an answer we take a step back and test whether the requested conﬁdence level has an
eﬀect on people's perceived level of conﬁdence in the ﬁrst place. Second, given the often
unsuccessful experimental attempts to link overconﬁdence and economic behavior at the in-
dividual level, another important open question is whether the use of frequency judgments
changes the relative ranking in overconﬁdence compared to the classic IP measure. Lastly,
the two overconﬁdence measures may be explained by individual background character-
istics such as cognitive abilities or the aversion of wide intervals which possibly explains
some experimental results.
The IP overconﬁdence measure rests on the assumption that people adopt the requested
conﬁdence level and adjust their interval estimates accordingly. Using the classical IP
paradigm we run an experiment in which we elicit perceived conﬁdence levels in the form
of frequency judgments, i.e. ex-post estimates of the number of hits in the IP, and we vary
the degree of requested conﬁdence. In two independent surveys in Switzerland and the
U.S., we employ a between-subject design in which participants are randomly assigned to
one of three treatments with requested conﬁdence levels of 30%, 60% or 90%. We conﬁrm
weaknesses of the IP measure presented in Teigen and Jørgensen (2005) and show that
decision makers not even adjust their frequency judgments to diﬀerent levels of requested
conﬁdence. Using decision makers' frequency judgments, we ﬁnd evidence that people
respond to an individual conﬁdence level that is unaﬀected by the requested conﬁdence
level. In all treatments, we observe large variations in individual conﬁdence that the
IP measure does not take into account. As a consequence, the consistency of the two
overconﬁdence measures is limited. People might appear very overconﬁdent in the IP
simply because their true conﬁdence level is overestimated by the requested level and vice
versa. We conclude that the IP as it is currently used, i.e. comparing hit rates with
requested conﬁdence levels, has major shortcomings for measuring overconﬁdence at both
the aggregate and individual level. As an alternative, we propose to use people's frequency
3
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judgments to measure overconﬁdence.
We would like to mention that we are not the ﬁrst to question the reliability of measuring
overconﬁdence with the IP on the aggregate level. Next to the aforementioned studies
(Teigen and Jørgensen, 2005; Cesarini et al., 2006; Winman et al., 2004), many previous
studies have raised speciﬁc methodological concerns with consequences for the aggregate
level of overconﬁdence. It has been shown, for example, that the alternative two-choice
question format (e.g., Koriat et al., 1980) yields lower levels of overconﬁdence than the
IP (Klayman et al., 1999). Similarly, exclusion instructions that induce people to think
about the values that lie outside of their provided intervals in the IP yield smaller levels of
overconﬁdence than inclusion questions (Soll and Klayman, 2004; Teigen and Jørgensen,
2005; Yaniv and Schul, 1997). Interestingly, other forms of overconﬁdence such as better-
than-average beliefs (Svenson, 1981) or the illusion of control (Langer, 1975) were found
to be inconsistent with the IP measure (Deaves et al., 2008; Glaser and Weber, 2007;
Hilton et al., 2011; Menkhoﬀ et al., 2006; Moore and Healy, 2008). Moreover, the level of
overconﬁdence has been found to vary with the diﬃculty (Lichtenstein et al., 1982) and
domain (Klayman et al., 1999) of the question set. Other studies attribute overconﬁdence
to measurement errors and sampling eﬀects of the question set that impair the validity
of otherwise well-working cues (Gigerenzer et al., 1991; Juslin, 1993, 1994; Soll, 1996).
Our work contributes to the understanding of how appropriate the IP measure is on the
aggregate level.
Additionally, our ﬁndings can help to explain previous puzzling results on the individual
level. While the IP has been found to predict some behavior like innovative activity, risk-
taking and ordering decisions of managers (Ben-David et al., 2013; Herz et al., 2014; Ren
and Croson, 2013), a wide range of studies is not able to explain economic behavior with
the IP overconﬁdence measure. In a recent study, for example, Ackert et al. (2015) ﬁnd
that investors who diversify more in an experimental asset market appear more overconﬁ-
dent in the IP which is at odds with previous ﬁndings (e.g. Goetzmann and Kumar, 2008).
Similarly, despite showing a negative relation of overconﬁdence and trading performance
(Biais et al., 2005; Deaves et al., 2008; Kirchler, 2002) experimental studies mostly fail to
conﬁrm the empirically hypothesized link between overconﬁdence and trading volume (Bi-
ais et al., 2005; Fellner-Röhling and Krügel, 2014; Glaser and Weber, 2007; Kirchler, 2002);
for empirical studies see (Barber and Odean, 2000, 2001; Statman et al., 2006).4 These
4Deaves et al. (2008) do ﬁnd a positive correlation between overconﬁdence and trading volume. However,
due to the speciﬁc experimental design they cannot exclude that the results are driven by better-than-
average beliefs. Similarly, Michailova and Schmidt (2011) ﬁnd larger trading volumes in markets consisting
4
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puzzling ﬁndings led Barber and Odean (2013) to hypothesize that this weak link might
be partially explained by the current inability to measure miscalibration well. Overall,
our results show that there is quite some truth in this hypothesis.
2 Experimental design
2.1 Experimental Procedure
Our experimental design consists of two main parts: The ﬁrst part involves the IP using
ten general knowledge items (see Table A.1 in Appendix B) as usually employed in the
literature. To establish comparability of our results, we use the same test as Biais et al.
(2005) and Hilton et al. (2011). Participants are instructed to estimate boundaries for
these ten general knowledge questions so that their certainty equals the requested level of
conﬁdence. We use three treatments with diﬀerent levels of requested conﬁdence: 30%,
60% and 90%. To support participants' attention to their requested conﬁdence level and
their understanding of its implication, we take several precautions. First, we increase the
salience of the requested conﬁdence level, expressed in percentage, by clearly highlighting
the relevant text from the remaining instructions. Second, we explicitly state how many
of the ten true values should on average fall inside of the provided intervals as people may
struggle with percentages (Gigerenzer and Hoﬀrage, 1995). Finally, we explain the intuition
of the assignment by a concrete example. Complete instructions of the experiment can be
found in Appendix B. After the standard IP procedure, we elicit frequency judgments by
requesting participants to estimate how many true items fall inside their intervals.5 These
frequency judgments provide a self-reported proxy for the individual conﬁdence level and
allow us to compute an alternative measure of overconﬁdence that accounts for individual
diﬀerences in conﬁdence.
In addition, we elicit the perceived degree of diﬃculty on a ﬁve point Likert scale
(1=very easy, 5=very diﬃcult) to control for the hard-easy eﬀect (Gigerenzer et al., 1991).
Finally, we aim to shed light on the construction of intervals and ask our participants to
of overconﬁdent traders compared to markets with less overconﬁdent traders using an alternative measure
of overconﬁdence based on perceived conﬁdence.
5In principle, frequency judgments can be incentivized by means of common incentive compatible
mechanisms. Cesarini et al. (2006) compared frequency judgments between two groups of which only one
was incentivized and did not ﬁnd signiﬁcant diﬀerences. In light of this weak evidence of the impact of
monetary incentives we refrained from using incentivized frequency judgments.
5
Page 6 of 29
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
explain how they generated their interval estimates with a free text question.6
In the second part we elicit several behavioral characteristics to analyze whether they
can explain individual diﬀerences in the IP overconﬁdence measure. We measure risk-
and loss aversion parameters of participants using incentivized binary choice questions
similar to Abdellaoui et al. (2008). To test cognitive skills we let participants perform an
adapted version of the Cognitive Reﬂection Test (CRT) of Frederick (2005). Since the IP
requires that participants report intervals of their subjective probability distributions for
non-random values, we further elicit risk literacy with the Berlin Numeracy Test (BNT)
(Cokely et al., 2012). Finally, we assess the degree to which participants avoid the use of
wide intervals using a methodology borrowed from Yaniv and Foster (1995). A detailed
description of the elicitation methodologies is provided in Appendix B.
2.2 Participants and Incentives
We conducted two online surveys in December 2014 and January 2015 with a total of 300
participants. One survey involves 151 participants on the crowd-sourcing platform Amazon
Mechanical Turk (MTurk). The survey instructions were in English using imperial units
for the IP questions. MTurk participants received a participation fee of $1.80. To provide
additional robustness for our results, we recruited 149 participants from the University of
Zurich in a second survey. Invitations for this survey were sent via email to a bachelor level
ﬁnance class and two master level ﬁnance and economics classes. The survey instructions
were either in English or German depending on the language of the course that we recruited
from. Students were asked to provide IP items in metric units. In each survey, ﬁve
participants were randomly chosen for a bonus payment to incentivize their risky choices
in Part 2 of the survey.7
To ensure that our data come from participants who completed all tasks properly and
without interruptions, we only include those observations for which the completion time
was more than ﬁve and less than sixty minutes.8 These constraints reduce the number of
6Additionally, the survey includes two questions for which we do not report the results in this study. We
ask participants to estimate the number of hits of the average participant and to provide one-year interval
forecasts for the level of either the Dow Jones Industrial Average or the Swiss Market Index depending on
the participant sample.
7The average payments amounted to 46.8 CHF and $ 22.4 in the Student and MTurk sample, respec-
tively. We deliberately chose larger stakes in the Student sample since a pilot study indicated longer
completion times for students. At the time of the study, 46.8 CHF were worth $ 31.43 in the U.S. consid-
ering the purchasing power parity level provided by OECD (http://stats.oecd.org).
8We impose the lower bound time constrained based on experience from a pilot study to exclude MTurk
participants that click-through the survey to maximize their hourly wage without carefully reading the
6
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participants to 276 (MTurk sample: 139; Student sample: 137). The fraction of women
is 40.3% and 30.7% in MTurk and Student sample, respectively. The two samples resem-
ble typical diﬀerences between students and MTurk participants (Goodman et al., 2013):
Participants in the MTurk sample have various educational backgrounds and the age dis-
tribution is more heterogeneous (between 18 years and 74 years) compared to the younger
students (between 18 years and 30 years). Moreover, the median time that students spent
on the survey (23:22min) is more than twice as long as in the MTurk sample (9:54min).
Sample Requested Conf. Min. Q1 Median Mean Q3 Max.
MTurk 30% 0 20 30 31.3 40 80
MTurk 60% 0 20 30 30.7 40 80
MTurk 90% 0 20 40 40.0 50 100
Biais et al. (2005) 90% 0 20 30 36.0 50 100
Table 1: This table reports summary statistics of the hit rate distributions of all treatments in the MTurk
sample. The second column displays the requested conﬁdence level. The columns Q1 and Q3 refer to the
ﬁrst and third quartiles, respectively. All ﬁgures are in percentages. This table also reports the hit rate
distribution found in Biais et al. (2005).
3 Results
The two participant samples yield very coherent results. In this section, we therefore
present ﬁndings of the MTurk sample and discuss only those results of the student sample
that are qualitatively diﬀerent. A detailed analysis of our ﬁndings in the student sample
is provided in Appendix A.
3.1 IP overconﬁdence measure
Generally, we ﬁnd that hit rates are very low with a global average of 34.2%. This is in
line with previous ﬁndings (e.g. Biais et al., 2005; Glaser and Weber, 2007; Hilton et al.,
2011). The Cronbach alpha is 0.64 which indicates reasonable internal consistency of the IP.
Table 1 shows summary statistics of the hit rate distributions for all three treatments, i.e.
requested conﬁdence levels of 30%, 60% and 90%. To rule out that our results are driven by
the limited control in online experiments or the potentially low qualiﬁcation or motivation
of MTurk participants, we compare the hit rate distributions of the 90% treatment with
instructions. The upper bound constraint should prevent interruptions. Employing other time constraints
(e.g. between 7 and 30 minutes) does not qualitatively change our results. We further exclude two
participants who admitted cheating in their full text explanations.
7
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Figure 1: Hit rates and the IP measure of overconﬁdence.
the ﬁndings of Biais et al. (2005) who solicit master level students to do the same IP with
a 90% requested conﬁdence level (and the same IP questio s) in a laboratory setting. It
turns out that the two distributions are strikingly similar, the MTurk sample even achieves
slightly larger hit rates. Hence, our IP results do not seem speciﬁc to an online experiment
with MTurk participants.
Despite the extreme variation in the requested conﬁdence level from 30% to 90%, av-
erage hit rates and hit rate distributions of the three treatments appear almost identical.
Figure 1a illustrates the average hit rate of each treatment in comparison to its respective
perfect calibration benchmark. In all treatments the hit rates are very similar and seem
virtually unaﬀected by the requested conﬁdence level. This observation is supported in a
Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test which does not yield statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences in hit
rates between the three treatments, although just marginally not (p = 0.10). Hence, the
participants show hardly any reaction to the requested conﬁdence level, which conﬁrms
the ﬁndings of Teigen and Jørgensen (2005).
Figure 1b illustrates what this result implies for the level of overconﬁdence in the three
treatment groups. Participants in the commonly used 90% and the 60% treatment are over-
conﬁdent on average, whereas participants in the 30% treatment appear almost perfectly
calibrated. Since participants fail to adjust their interval estimates, the IP yields degrees
of overconﬁdence that largely depend on the arbitrary choice of the requested conﬁdence
level by the experimenter. As a consequence, it appears diﬃcult to draw conclusions from
the IP about the true magnitude of overconﬁdence at the group level.
We analyze the extent to which behavioral characteristics are able to explain the
8
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Hit rate regressions on behavioral factors
Conﬁdence CRT BNT RA LA WIA Diﬃculty Gender Intercept Adj. R2 # obs.
Panel A: MTurk sample
0.114 0.131∗ −0.033∗ −0.007 −0.046 −0.060∗ 0.001 0.566∗∗
0.101 139
(0.073) (0.050) (0.015) (0.010) (0.064) (0.028) (0.037) (0.151)
0.120 0.133∗ −0.035∗ −0.005 −0.049 −0.071∗ 0.011 0.651∗∗
0.088 139
(0.074) (0.061) (0.015) (0.010) (0.065) (0.028) (0.037) (0.149)
Panel B: Student sample
0.220∗∗ 0.067 -0.005 0.012 -0.099 0.004 0.029 0.158
0.052 137
(0.079) (0.068) (0.024) (0.013) (0.071) (0.029) (0.047) (0.141)
0.205∗ 0.041 -0.005 0.012 -0.091 0.010 0.041 0.163
0.049 137
(0.079) (0.056) (0.024) (0.013) (0.070) (0.028) (0.044) (0.142)
Signiﬁcance levels: ∗∗ : p < 0.01; ∗ : p < 0.05.
Table 2: This table reports OLS regression coeﬃcients and the respective standard errors in parenthesis of
the regression model HRi = α+ β1Confidencei + β2CAi + β3RAi + β4LAi + β5WIAi + β6Difficultyi +
β7Genderi + i where HRi is the hit rate, and CAi is one of the two measures of cognitive abilities: CRTi
or BNTi. Panel A and B show results of the MTurk and student sample, respectively. The independent
variables are as follows: Conﬁdence indicates the requested conﬁdence level; CRT is the ratio of correct
answers in the Cognitive Reﬂection Test; BNT is the ratio of correct answers in the Berlin Numeracy
Test; RA is the estimated parameter of risk aversion; LA is the estimated parameter of loss aversion; WIA
is ratio of narrow intervals chosen in the wide interval aversion test; Diﬃculty is the perceived level of
diﬃculty of the question set; Gender is a dummy variable equal to one if the observation stems from a
male participant. A detailed explanation of the construction of the independent variables can be found in
Appendix B.
between-subject variation in the IP overconﬁdence measure using OLS regressions with
hit rate as dependent variable. To that end, we pool the data of the three treatments and
use the requested conﬁdence level as an independent variable. In all regressions we control
for gender and the perceived diﬃcul y of the question set. The results are shown in Table
2. We ﬁnd that participants in the MTurk sample with better cognitive abilities and better
numeracy skills achieve larger hit rates and therefore appear signiﬁcantly less overconﬁ-
dent (p < 0.05). This is an interesting ﬁnding as it might explain some puzzling results in
which experimenters try to link overconﬁdence to individual economic behavior, e.g. the
ﬁnding that overconﬁdent investors are less proﬁtable but do not trade more. In line with
the results above the requested conﬁdence level does not aﬀect hit rates. Interestingly,
we ﬁnd no gender eﬀects but a signiﬁcant hard-easy eﬀect indicating a negative relation
between hit rates and the perceived diﬃculty of the question set (p < 0.05). Finally, the
regression results suggest that a larger degree of risk aversion is associated with lower hit
rates (p < 0.05).
The regression results in the student sample diﬀer in two main aspects. First, we ﬁnd
that none of the coeﬃcients of the behavioral characteristics is signiﬁcant. A potential
9
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reason for the insigniﬁcant coeﬃcients of the CRT score and the coeﬃcient of risk aversion
is the lack of variation in these measures. In the student sample more than 79% (49%)
of the students are able to correctly answer at least two (all) of the questions in the CRT
compared to 62% (31%) in the MTurk sample. Likewise, the variation in risk aversion is
smaller in the student sample (sd = 0.85) than in the MTurk sample (sd = 1.19). Possibly
more sophisticated tests would have led to more pronounced results and cognitive abilities
might still be linked with interval widths. The lack of variation cannot explain diﬀerent
results in the BNT score coeﬃcient. But since students take signiﬁcantly more time to
ﬁnish the survey one might argue that the ability of the CRT and BNT to discriminate
the students by their cognitive abilities is limited. The second diﬀerence is that students
are slightly more sensitive to the requested conﬁdence level than MTurk participants. The
coeﬃcient of the requested conﬁdence level is signiﬁcant (in one speciﬁcation at the 1%
level). Nevertheless, the size of the eﬀect is in line with the limited sensitivity found in the
hit rate results of the student sample (see Appendix A).
Altogether, the regression results are mixed, but suggest that the precision of the IP
overconﬁdence measure might be impaired by addition l individual characteristics such as
cognitive abilities and risk preferences.
0.0
2.5
5.0
7.5
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30% 60% 90%
Requested Confidence Level (Treatment)
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MTurk
Students
Benchmark
Figure 2: Average frequency judgments with standard error bars grouped by treatment. The dark grey
bars indicate the respective benchmark levels of conﬁdence that is assumed by the IP.
3.2 Frequency overconﬁdence measure
We very clearly instructed participants that they should expect to achieve a hit rate
that equals the requested conﬁdence level. Nevertheless, only 12.3% of the participants'
10
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Distribution of frequency judgments
Bins: 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Total
Panel A: MTurk sample
Treatments:
30% 3 0 7 6 5 6 4 5 3 2 3 44
60% 2 1 5 5 5 13 3 4 4 1 1 44
90% 1 3 4 6 4 8 5 2 8 8 1 50
Panel B: Student sample
Treatments:
30% 0 0 1 12 4 8 4 10 6 0 0 45
60% 0 0 3 2 2 4 18 4 7 0 1 41
90% 2 0 1 2 2 10 6 12 7 8 1 51
Table 3: This table lists for all possible values of frequency judgments the number of participants that
chose the respective value.
frequency judgments were exactly in line with the instructions. In all treatments, the
average frequency judgments are very close to ﬁve and range only from 4.73 in the 60%
treatment to 5.50 in the 90% treatment (see Figure 2). Using a Kruskal-Wallis test we can-
not reject the null hypothesis that the location parameters of the distributions of frequency
judgments in the three treatments are the same. Moreover, we ﬁnd large heterogeneity in
frequency judgments between subjects in all treatments covering the whole range from
zero to ten (see Table 3). The standard deviation is between 2.31 and 2.74. In line with
this, just 3.6% of the participants mention the requested conﬁdence level in the free text
explanations of how they constructed the range estimates. Students appear slightly more
sensitive to the instructions than MTurk workers (see Figure 2). However, the main results
are qualitively in line with the MTurk sample: we ﬁnd large variations in frequency judg-
ments in all treatments and only the diﬀerence in frequency judgments between the 30%
and 90% treatment is statistically signiﬁcant (see Appendix A.2). The large amount of
heterogeneity in frequency judgments indicates that there exist substantial diﬀerences in
conﬁdence even among participants of the same treatment. Further, the missing treatment
eﬀect shows that the requested conﬁdence level hardly aﬀects perceived conﬁdence levels,
if at all, even though the relation is explicitly stressed in the instructions. This is in stark
contrast to the implicit assumption of the IP.
In the following, we calculate overconﬁdence based on perceived conﬁdence (frequency
overconﬁdence) as the diﬀerence between relative frequency judgments and achieved hit
rates for each participant. The resulting distributions of frequency overconﬁdence are illus-
trated as boxplots in Figure 3. In line with previous ﬁndings (Cesarini et al., 2006; Winman
et al., 2004), frequency judgments yield moderate overconﬁdence. The average level of fre-
quency overconﬁdence is nearly identical in all treatments at roughly 16%. In contrast to
11
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the IP measure, the diﬀerences in overconﬁdence based on frequency judgments are not sta-
tistically signiﬁcant between the three treatments in a Kruskal-Wallis test. Consequently,
frequency overconﬁdence turns out to be coherent throughout all treatments. Analogous
−1.0
−0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
30% 60% 90%
 Requested Confidence Level (Treatment)
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y O
ve
rc
on
fid
en
ce
MTurk
Students
Figure 3: Boxplot of frequency overconﬁdence grouped by treatments. The edges of the boxes indicate the
ﬁrst and third quartile. The upper and lower whiskers extend from the hinge to the highest and lowest
value that is within 1.5 times of the inter quartile range of the hinge, respectively.
to the analysis of the IP measure we run regressions to test if frequency overconﬁdence
is associated with individual characteristics. The regression results (see Table 4) conﬁrm
that frequency overconﬁdence is not aﬀected by requested conﬁdence level. In contrast to
the IP measure, frequency overconﬁdence does not correlate with cognitive abilities. In
the MTurk sample larger degrees of frequency overconﬁdence are positively associated with
wide-interval aversion. Moreover, we ﬁnd some evidence that male participants are more
overconﬁdent. Similar to the hit rate regressions we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant coeﬃcients in the
student sample regressions (see Panel B of Table 4).
It remains the question to what extent the two measures are consistent in their rank-
ing of individual overconﬁdence. A priori one should expect that the two measures are
perfectly consistent since both are designed to measure individual overconﬁdence. The ob-
served heterogeneity in individual conﬁdence, however, suggests that the IP measure ranks
people diﬀerently because it is based on a homogeneous conﬁdence level. Additionally,
the diﬀerences in the regression results indicate limits of the consistency between the two
measures. To quantify and analyze the consistency of the two measures we compute the
rank correlation coeﬃcient Kendall's τb. We do the calculation for each treatment sepa-
rately due to the treatment eﬀect on the IP overconﬁdence measure. In the MTurk sample,
we ﬁnd that the correlation ranges between 0.30 (30% and 90% treatment) to 0.42 (60%
12
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Frequency overconﬁdence regressions on behavioral factors
Conﬁdence CRT BNT RA LA WIA Diﬃculty Gender Intercept Adj. R2 # obs.
Panel A: MTurk sample
−0.033 0.027 0.017 0.002 0.290∗∗ −0.062 0.095∗ 0.250
0.109 138
(0.093) (0.064) (0.019) (0.012) (0.081) (0.036) (0.047) (0.191)
−0.025 0.113 0.017 0.002 0.286∗∗ −0.068 0.089 0.267
0.123 138
(0.092) (0.076) (0.019) (0.012) (0.081) (0.035) (0.046) (0.185)
Panel B: Student sample
0.005 0.033 0.044 −0.015 0.093 −0.018 0.058 0.141
0.015 137
(0.082) (0.070) (0.025) (0.013) (0.073) (0.030) (0.048) (0.146)
-0.006 0.049 0.046 -0.016 0.094 -0.015 0.059 0.128
0.018 137
(0.082) (0.058) (0.025) (0.013) (0.072) (0.029) (0.045) (0.146)
Signiﬁcance levels: ∗∗ : p < 0.01: ∗ : p < 0.05
Table 4: This table reports OLS regression coeﬃcients and the respective standard errors in parenthesis of
the regression model fOCi = α+β1Confidencei +β2CAi +β3RAi +β4LAi +β5WIAi +β6Difficultyi +
β7Genderi + i where fOCi is frequency overconﬁdence, and CAi is one of the two measures of cognitive
abilities: CRTi or BNTi. Panel A and B show results of the MTurk and student sample, respectively.
The independent variables are as follows: Conﬁdence indicates the requested conﬁdence level; CRT is
the ratio of correct answers in the Cognitive Reﬂection Test; BNT is the ratio of correct answers in the
Berlin Numeracy Test; RA is the estimated parameter of risk aversion; LA is the estimated parameter of
loss aversion; WIA is ratio of narrow intervals chosen in the wide interval aversion test; Diﬃculty is the
perceived level of diﬃculty of the question set; Gender is a dummy variable equal to one if the observation
stems from a male participant. A detailed explanation of the construction of the independent variables
can be found in Appendix B.
treatment). The correlation coeﬃcients in the student sample are slightly larger and range
between 0.41 (90% treatment) and 0.52 (60% treatment). The positive relation of the two
measures is signiﬁcant at the 1% level in all treatments of the student sample and in the
60% treatment of the MTurk sample (in the 30% and 90% treatment of the MTurk sample:
p < 0.05). The moderate size of the coeﬃcients, however, indicates that the consistency is
limited because the two measures disagree in their overconﬁdence ranking in a considerable
number of cases. The level of correlation is at least so low that it will likely eﬀect results
on the individual level in studies that analyze the relation between overconﬁdence and
economic behavior. Thus, taking into account the individual conﬁdence level of partici-
pants not only reduces aggregate overconﬁdence but also changes the individual ranking of
overconﬁdence compared to the IP measure. Given the insensitivity of participants to their
requested conﬁdence level we conclude that overconﬁdence based on frequency judgments
provides a more accurate measure of individual overconﬁdence.
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4 Conclusion
Judgmental overconﬁdence gives people excessive trust in their own (biased) judgment.
For many areas, such as management, politics, or investment advice, it is extremely impor-
tant to understand how exactly overconﬁdence aﬀects the economic behavior of individuals.
But to answer this ultimately empirical question, a reliable method of measuring overconﬁ-
dence is needed. Measuring overconﬁdence in the ﬁeld is tricky and has to rely on proxies.
Researchers hence escape to the laboratory. The most widely used lab test is the In-
terval Production task (IP). Given the importance of overconﬁdence for many real-world
applications, we critically analyze the appropriateness of the IP to measure judgmental
overconﬁdence. In theory, the test provides an elegant way to measure the extent to which
someone overestimates the precision of her own knowledge. It is ba ed on the assumption
that people adopt the conﬁdence level that is requested by the experimenter. We ﬁnd, how-
ever, the decision makers' stated intervals and perceived conﬁdence are virtually unaﬀected
by the requested conﬁdence level. Additionally, participants display very diﬀerent levels
of conﬁdence in their interval estimates. By ignoring these individual diﬀerences in conﬁ-
dence, the IP measure is likely to yield an imprecise overconﬁdence ranking. These results
are in line with the hypothesis of Barber and Odean (2013) that some puzzling results
in behavioral ﬁnance may be due to the inability to measure individual overconﬁdence.
We also ﬁnd some evidence that cognitive abilities are correlated with measured overcon-
ﬁdence which might explain why experimental studies ﬁnd a link between overconﬁdence
and trading success but not trading volume.
Our results suggest that the widely used classical IP measure is to be treated with
caution. Instead of specifying the level of conﬁdence we propose to elicit it. One way of
doing so is to use frequency judgments as individual conﬁdence levels. The resulting over-
conﬁdence measure yields moderate and coherent overconﬁdence throughout all treatments
and participant samples. We ﬁnd only limited consistency between the two overconﬁdence
measures. As a consequence, overconﬁdence based on frequency judgments seems to pro-
vide a promising measure to be used in experiments that aim to link overconﬁdence and
economic behavior. Even more so in real world situations  outside the laboratory  people
should not be expected to internalize prescribed conﬁdence levels. Our results suggest that
a better way of eliciting conﬁdence intervals is to ﬁrst demand a rough range estimate and
subsequently ask for the conﬁdence in that interval.
These are important insights, given the often missing link in experimental studies be-
tween measured overconﬁdence and economic behavior. To draw useful conclusion from
14
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experimental studies on overconﬁdence for the real world, it will be essential to have robust
measurements in place. Our ﬁndings show limitations of a currently popular method and
provide alternative solutions.
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Appendix A Results in the student sample
A.1 IP overconﬁdence measure
Participants in the student sample achieve fairly low hit rates in all treatments (global
average: 35.3%). Overall, the results look very similar to the MTurk sample (see Figure
1a). In fact, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in hit rates between the two samples on the
treatment level using Mann-Whitney tests. The Cronbach alpha of 0.67 in the student
sample indicates the same level of internal consistency as in the MTurk sample. Within
the student sample, we observe very similar hit rate distributions of the three treatments.
In a Kruskal-Wallis test we ﬁnd signiﬁcant diﬀerences (p = 0.02) in the median hit
rates which is mainly driven by the diﬀerence between the 30% and the 90% treatment
(Mann-Whitney: p < 0.01). Changing the requested conﬁdence level by 30 percentage
points, however, has no signiﬁcant eﬀect on hit rates.9
Thus, we ﬁnd that in comparison to MTurk workers our students show a slightly larger
degree of sensitivity to the requested conﬁdence level. However, we need extreme variations
in the requested conﬁdence level to achieve statistical signiﬁcance despite the relatively
large number of participants. By and large, students also fail to suﬃciently adjust their
intervals. This becomes obvious when we compare the obtained levels of overconﬁdence
between the treatments (see Figure 1b). Almost identical to the MTurk sample, the 30%
treatment achieves almost perfect calibration, and overconﬁdence signiﬁcantly increases
with the level of requested conﬁdence.
A.2 Frequency overconﬁdence measure
Students seem to adjust their frequency judgments nearly as little as the MTurk par-
ticipants (see Figure 2). Only about a quarter (27.7%) of the frequency judgments is in
line with the requested conﬁdence level. Although this ﬁgure is larger than for the MTurk
sample, the frequency judgments in the student sample exhibit a similar amount of vari-
ation. The standard deviation ranges from 1.77 to 2.22 and frequency judgments cover
the whole range of possible answers. Likewise, the full text explanations resemble the
same patterns as in the MTurk sample with only 7.3% of the students mentioning their
requested conﬁdence level. Within the student sample, we ﬁnd signiﬁcant diﬀerences in fre-
quency judgments between treatments in a Kruskal-Wallis test (p = 0.02). This diﬀerence
9The non-parametric Mann-Whitney test yields p-values of 0.20 and 0.12 for the comparison of the 30%
vs. 60% and 60% vs. 90% treatments, respectively.
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is primarily driven by the diﬀerence between the 30% and 90% treatment (Mann-Whitney:
p < 0.01) because a change of the requested conﬁdence level by 30 percentage points has no
statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect.10 This ﬁnding is almost identical to the hit rate results: stu-
dents display a small amount of sensitivity that becomes visible only for extreme variations
of the requested conﬁdence level. As a consequence, the eﬀect size is only marginal and
frequency judgments, by and large, appear unaﬀected by the requested conﬁdence level.
The frequency overconﬁdence is moderate with an average of 23.2% and slightly larger
than in the student sample. The distributions of frequency overconﬁdence look very similar
in all treatments (see Figure 3). Indeed, we cannot reject the null hyptothesis in a Kruskal-
Wallis test.
Appendix B Details on the Experimental Design
All surveys were created with the online tool SurveyMonkeyTM and participants were
provided a link to start the survey either via email or through Amazon Mechanical Turk.
Figure A.1 shows a screenshot of the landing page of the survey. In this section, the
elicitation methods and tasks used in the survey studies are explained in detail. In addi-
tion, instructions from the two surveys conducted with English speaking participants are
provided for every task. The order of tasks is identical to the order in the survey.
Socio-demographics: In the beginning of the survey participants are asked to provide
socio-demographic information about their gender, age, level of education and average
household income.
Interval Production Task (IP): We choose the ten general knowledge items
used in Biais et al. (2005) for the IP. To prevent order eﬀects the sequence of the
items is randomized for each subject. Figure A.2 shows a screenshot of three of the
ten general knowledge items of the IP with a requested conﬁdence level of 60%. A list
of all ten items is provided in Table A.1. Every participant reads the following instructions:
On this page you will see 10 text descriptions of numerical general knowledge items,
e.g. age at death of Martin Luther King. Please provide a lower bound and upper bound
estimate for each value.
10A Mann-Whitney test between the 60% and 30% (90%) treatment yields a p-value of 0.13 (0.17).
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Figure A.1: Screenshot of the landing page of the survey.
You should choose your estimates such that you are 90 % / 60% / 30% certain that
the true value lies within your range. This means that on average 9 / 6 / 3 out of 10 true
values should fall into your ranges.
Example: Suppose you are 90 % / 60% / 30% certain that the city Berlin has be-
tween 2 million and 5 million citizens. Then your answers are: lower bound: 2,000,000;
and upper bound 5,000,000.
The 11th item of the IP always involves the stock market prediction task which is
optional for all participants. We informed participants about the previous day's closing
level of the respective stock index.
Subsequent to the IP, we ask participants the following four questions:
• How many true values of the ﬁrst 10 general knowledge items from the previous page
do you expect to lie within your provided ranges?
• How many true values of the ﬁrst 10 general knowledge items from the previous page
do you expect to lie within the provided ranges of the average Mturker?
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Item
Martin Luther King's age at death
Length of the Nile River
Number of countries that are members of OPEC
Number of books in the Old Testament
Weight of an empty Boeing 747
Year in which the composer Johann Sebastian Bach was born
Average gestation period of an elephant
Diameter of the moon
Air distance from London to Tokyo
Deepest known point in the oceans
Table A.1: General knowledge items of the IP.
• How diﬃcult did you ﬁnd the 10 general knowledge items?
• (Optional:) How did you come up with your range estimates? (Please write one or
two sentences)
The diﬃculty question is answered on a 5 Point Likert scale (1 = very diﬃcult; 5 =
very easy). The order of answers is counterbalanced such that the scale starts either with
very easy or very diﬃcult with probability of 50% each.
Risk- and loss aversion: We elicit parameters for risk- and loss aversion of every
participant using choice questions between a sure payoﬀ and a simple binary lottery. The
decisions for each domain are displayed on separate a page of the survey. To elicit risk
aversion we keep the binary lottery constant for all choices and only increase the sure
payoﬀ. We use the number of sure payoﬀ choices as a parameter for risk aversion (RA).
The parameter for loss aversion (LA) is obtained analogously. But here, we keep the sure
payoﬀ constant at zero and sequentially increase the positive payoﬀ of the risky lottery.
Figure A.3 and Figure A.4 show examples of the lotteries for the elicitation of risk- and
loss aversion, respectively. The instructions for the risk- and loss aversion elicitation of
the survey are as follows:
On the following 3 pages, you have to make ten decisions each between a sure pay-
oﬀ and a coin ﬂip gamble. The coin ﬂip gamble can yield one of two possible payoﬀs (both
with 50% probability). These payoﬀs can involve gains as well as losses.
19
Page 20 of 29
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
Figure A.2: Screenshot of the IP with a requested conﬁdence level of 60%.
Bonus payment:
You receive an endowment of $15 (30 CHF). Out of all participants ﬁve will be randomly
selected to play out one of their ten decisions in real money based on a $15 (30 CHF)
endowment. For these participants one of their ten decisions will be randomly selected
and paid out. If you select the sure payoﬀ for the selected decision you will receive this
gain plus the $15 (30 CHF) endowment. If you select the coin-ﬂip gamble for the selected
decision one of the possible payoﬀs will be randomly selected for you with 50% probability
each. If it is a gain it will be added to your endowment. If it is a loss it will be subtracted
from your endowment.
Please indicate for each choice which of the prospects you would prefer. Bear in
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mind that every single decision may be played out in real money!
The last paragraph is shown on the top of each of the three pages.
Cognitive Reﬂection Test (CRT): We use an amended version of the original cogni-
tive reﬂection test of Frederick (2005) to prevent people who know the original from using
their memorized values.
• Two iron plates weigh 5.5kg in total. The smaller plate weighs 5kg less than the
heavier one. How many kg does the small plate weigh?
• 3 workers need 3 days to produce 3 guitars. How many days would it take 10 workers
for 10 guitars?
• On a meadow, there is a patch of ﬂowers. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If
it takes 48 days for the patch to cover the meadow, how many days would it take for
the patch to cover half of the meadow?
The test score (CRT ) is the ratio of correct answers.
Figure A.3: Risk aversion binary choice.
Berlin Numeracy Test (BNT): We test our participants' skills in probability and
statistics using the three question Berlin Numeracy Test of Cokely et al. (2012). The
questions are asked in increasing order of diﬃculty:
1. Out of 1000 people in a village 500 are a member of the choir. Out of these 500
members 100 are men. Out of the 500 people that don't sing in the choice 300 are
men. How big is the probability that a randomly picked man is a member of the choir?
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Figure A.4: Loss aversion binary choice.
2. In a forest 20% of the mushrooms are red, 50% are brown and 30% are white. A
red mushroom is poisonous with probability of 20%. A mushroom that is not red is
poisonous with probability of 5%. What is the probability that a poisonous mushroom
in the forest is red?
3. Imagine you are throwing a biased die (with six sides) 70 times. The probability that
the die is twice as high as the probability for each of the other numbers. On average,
out of these 70 throws how many times would the die show the number 6?
The test score (BNT ) is the ratio of correct answers.
Wide-interval aversion (WIA): The last part of the survey is designed to obtain a
proxy of the aversion towards wide intervals. The test is borrowed from Yaniv and Foster
(1995) who argue that people are facing a trade-oﬀ between informativeness and accuracy
when answering the IP: The wider the interval estimate the more likely it is that the true
value falls inside of it (high accuracy), but at the same time the information content of the
statement is diluted (low informativeness) and vice versa. They ﬁnd evidence that people
tend to provide narrow intervals due to a preference for high informativeness (Yaniv and
Foster, 1997). The elicitation task involves choosing a preferred interval description for a
certain value. Each choice is made between two intervals of which one is always wider and
includes the true value and the other is narrower but does not include the true value. For
all three choices the wide interval is approximately centered around the true value. The
choices only diﬀer in the distance of the narrow interval from the true value. Below you
ﬁnd the three choices in increasing order of distance. In the experiment the order of items
was randomized for all subjects. The measure of aversion towards wide intervals (WIA) is
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the ratio of narrow intervals chosen. The complete task is shown below:
A couple of years ago a researcher had to prepare a presentation. Since he was
missing a couple of precise values he asked two colleagues for an estimation of the true
values. Now - thanks to the internet and search engines - the researcher is able to look up
the precise true values and is able to evaluate the estimates of his colleagues.
Imagine you are this researcher. Please indicate for each value which estimate you
think is better.
• Amount of money spent on education by the US federal government in 1987. The
true value is: $22.5 billions. Which estimate do you think is better? (A:$20 billions
to $40 billions; B:$18 billions to $20 billions)
• Start of the Sino (Chinese) - Japanese war. The true value is: 1894. Which estimate
do you think is better? (A: 1870 to 1890; B: 1875 to 1925)
• Air distance between Chicago and New York. The true value is: 717 miles. Which
estimate do you think is better? (A: 800 miles to 850 miles; B: 600 miles to 800 miles)
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Manuscript: Do We Measure Overconfidence? A Closer Look at the Interval Production Task 
 
Highlights: 
- People’s perceived confidence is unaffected by the requested confidence level 
- The IP overconfidence measure neglects heterogeneity in perceived confidence  
- The consistency of the IP and frequency overconfidence measures is limited 
- The two overconfidence measures are related to different characteristics  
- Our findings might explain the missing link of many experimental studies 
*Highlights (for review)
